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QUARTERMAN/BREWER v.
QUARTERMAN:
A COURT DIVIDED OVER
WHAT CONSTITUTES
“CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
FEDERAL LAW”
JAROD R. STEWART*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) sets forth the conditions under which a court may grant a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas relief is granted when the
proceedings leading to conviction “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.”1 A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court
precedent if it: (1) unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the
facts of a particular case; or (2) extends a legal rule to a situation
where it should not apply or fails to extend a rule to a situation where
it should apply.2
In the consolidated cases of Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and
Brewer v. Quarterman, both petitioners were sentenced to death
under Texas’s then-applicable statutory special issue instructions,
which asked the jury to determine (1) whether the defendant’s
conduct was committed deliberately, and (2) whether there was a
probability that the defendant would commit future violent acts.

* 2008 J.D., Duke University School of Law.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996) (emphasis added).
2. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).
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Under this statutory regime, if the jury answered both issues in the
affirmative, the judge was required to impose the death penalty. In
1989, the Supreme Court held that Texas’s special issue instructions
were insufficient to give full effect to a defendant’s mitigating
evidence of mental retardation and a history of severe childhood
abuse.3 Drawing on that decision, both Abdul-Kabir and Brewer filed
applications for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Abdul-Kabir and Brewer argued that
the special issue instructions did not permit jurors to give full effect to
the mitigating qualities of their abused childhoods and mental
impairment.4 By a vote of 5-4, the Court agreed with Abdul-Kabir’s
and Brewer’s arguments and therefore granted relief.5 The Supreme
Court held that their applications for a writ of habeas corpus should
have been granted because the Texas state court decisions denying
Abdul-Kabir and Brewer post-conviction relief were “contrary to”
and “involved unreasonable application[s] of clearly established
federal law.”6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Abdul-Kabir
Jalil Abdul-Kabir, formerly known as Ted Calvin Cole,7 was
convicted of capital murder in 1987 for strangling Raymond
Richardson.8 At his sentencing hearing, prosecutors introduced
aggravating evidence, including several prior convictions and expert
testimony that described Cole as a sociopath who showed no promise
of learning from his experiences.9 Cole presented two categories of
mitigating evidence: (1) testimony from family members describing
his unhappy childhood; and (2) expert testimony discussing the
consequences of his childhood.10 The State discouraged jurors from

3. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989).
4. Brief of Petitioner at 13, Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007) (No. 0511284) [hereinafter Abdul-Kabir’s brief]; Brief of Petitioner at 9, Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S.
Ct. 1706 (2007) (No. 05-11287) [hereinafter Brewer’s brief].
5. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1659 (2007).
6. Id.; Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1710 (2007).
7. This commentary will refer to the petitioner as Cole, and will only use “Abdul-Kabir”
when referring to the Supreme Court’s actual opinion.
8. Cole v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 494, 496–97 (5th Cir. 2005).
9. Abdul-Kabir’s brief, supra note 4, at 3–4.
10. Id. at 4.
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taking this evidence into account when determining the special issues,
and asserted that each juror had a duty to objectively answer the
issues based on the facts rather than on their own views about what
11
sentence would be appropriate for Cole. The jury answered both
special issues in the affirmative and Cole was sentenced to death.12
After his sentence was affirmed on appeal, Cole’s application for
post-conviction relief was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal
13
Appeals. Shortly thereafter, he sought habeas corpus relief in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the special issues
14
constrained the jury from giving full effect to his mitigating evidence.
The district court dismissed Cole’s petition because, under the Fifth
Circuit’s “screening test,”15 there was no nexus between his
16
mental/emotional condition and the murder. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Cole’s application for a
certificate of appealability.17 Shortly thereafter, in Tennard v. Dretke,18
the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “screening test”
19
established by Davis v. Scott, and vacated and remanded Cole’s case
for further proceedings consistent with Tennard.20
On remand, the Fifth Circuit granted Cole a certificate of
appealability, but affirmed the district court’s denial of the writ of
habeas corpus.21 The Court of Appeals concluded that the Texas
special issue instructions allowed the jury to consider and give full
22
effect to Cole’s mitigating evidence.
B. Brewer
Brent Ray Brewer was sentenced to death for a murder he
committed while perpetrating a robbery. At his sentencing hearing,
Brewer presented testimony that he was abused by his father, had
used drugs, and had suffered from depression.23 As in Cole’s case, the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1661.
Cole, 418 F.3d at 497.
Id.
Id.
Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460–61 (5th Cir. 1995).
Cole, 418 F.3d at 497.
Id. at 498.
542 U.S. 274 (2004).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 289.
Cole, 418 F.3d at 496.
Id. at 511.
Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2006).
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prosecutor discouraged jurors from exercising their own moral
judgment in determining Brewer’s sentence, and directed them to
answer the questions based solely on the evidence presented at trial.24
Brewer proposed several jury instructions designed to give effect to
the mitigating evidence he had presented, but the trial judge rejected
all of Brewer’s suggested instructions.25 The jury was then instructed
to answer the two Texas special issue instructions, which they did in
26
the affirmative.
Brewer’s application for post-conviction relief was denied by the
27
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Like Cole, Brewer sought habeas
corpus relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the
special issues instruction constrained the jury from giving full effect to
28
his mitigating evidence. The district court granted the writ of habeas
29
corpus, but the Fifth Circuit reversed.30 The Court of Appeals
distinguished Brewer’s evidence from that presented in Penry I, on
the ground that Brewer’s mental illness was neither permanent nor
severe.31 According to the Fifth Circuit, violations of Penry I involving
mental illness evidence have only occurred where the illness is
32
“chronic and/or immutable.”
III. THE COURT’S OPINIONS
In the consolidated cases of Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and
Brewer v. Quarterman, the majority held 5-4 that the decisions of the
Texas state courts denying post-conviction relief to Cole and Brewer
were both “contrary to” and “involved . . . unreasonable application[s]
of clearly established Federal law.”33 The lynchpin of this holding is
the existence of clearly established Supreme Court precedent about
mitigating evidence in capital sentencing cases. Justice Stevens wrote
the majority opinion in both cases. Much of Justice Stevens’s opinion
in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman is devoted to reviewing the Court’s
death penalty jurisprudence to illustrate the “clearly established law”

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Brewer’s brief, supra note 4, at 5–6.
Id.
Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1710–11 (2007).
Ex parte Brewer, 50 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim App. 2001).
Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1712.
Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 280.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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that the Texas state court failed to rely upon when denying relief to
both petitioners.34 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence was anything but clearly
established in 1999, and thus the state court’s decisions can neither be
labeled as contrary to, nor as unreasonable applications of, clearly
established federal law.35
A. Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinions
1. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman
In Abdul-Kabir, Justice Stevens concluded that “well before”
Penry I, the Court’s precedents had firmly established that sentencing
juries must be able to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence.36
According to the majority, a trio of cases began to lay the groundwork
37
for this well-established principle—Woodson v. North Carolina,
38
39
Proffitt v. Florida, and Jurek v. Texas. In Woodson, the Court
invalidated a capital punishment statute because it did not permit
jurors to consider the defendant’s character and background before
imposing the death penalty.40 The Court upheld Florida’s and Texas’s
41
42
death penalty statutes in Proffitt and Jurek because they admitted
without restriction all mitigating evidence. Justice Stevens, however,
noted that a majority of the Court subsequently recognized that the
holding in Jurek did not preclude finding that Texas’s death penalty
statute was unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant.”43
Continuing his review, Justice Stevens pointed to Chief Justice
Burger’s plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, which stated that the
sentencer cannot be precluded from considering any mitigating
evidence as a basis for giving the defendant less than the death
44
sentence. The Court subsequently approved and broadened this
plurality rule in Eddings v. Oklahoma, when the majority concluded

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See discussion infra, Part A.
See discussion infra, Part B.
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion).
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257–58.
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J.J.).
Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1665 (referencing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988)).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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that jurors in capital cases must be allowed to consider any relevant
mitigating evidence.45
Justice O’Connor further cemented the principles announced in
46
Lockett and Eddings in her concurrence to Franklin v. Lynaugh, in
which it was first recognized that a juror must be able to not only
consider, but also to give effect to mitigating evidence. Justice
O’Connor emphasized that a jury’s ability to consider and weigh
mitigating evidence would be meaningless without the power to give
effect to that evidence during sentencing.47 When mitigating evidence
is relevant to one of the special issues, a juror can give such evidence
full effect in considering the death penalty, but when a defendant’s
mitigating evidence is not relevant to the special issues, a juror would
48
have no vehicle for considering such evidence.
According to the majority, Penry I was both the most important
decision in this area of the law and the decision that governed the
49
facts of Cole’s case. Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that the
decision in Penry I did not create a new rule of law, but was dictated
by Lockett and Eddings, and used this as evidence of the existence of
“clearly established law.”50 In Penry I, the Court incorporated the
teachings of Lockett and Eddings, as well as Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Franklin, and held that Texas’s statutory special issue
instructions were insufficient to permit jurors to give full effect to
Penry’s mitigating evidence.51 At trial, although Penry presented
evidence that he was mentally retarded and severely abused as a
child, the jury answered the special issues in the affirmative and the
judge sentenced him to death.52
The Supreme Court concluded that Penry’s mental retardation
was relevant to the first special issue, whether the defendant acted
deliberately, but that it was also relevant to “his moral culpability
53
beyond the scope of the special verdict question.” With respect to
the second special issue, future dangerousness, the Court found that
the jury could not give full effect to Penry’s mitigating evidence
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982).
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
Id. at 185 (O’Connor, J. concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1668 (2007).
Id.
Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989).
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 322.
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because his mental retardation was labeled as an aggravating factor
that indicated a possibility of future dangerousness.54 Thus, Texas’s
special issues allowed jurors to give full effect only to mitigating
evidence that was offered to disprove deliberateness or future
dangerousness, and did not tell jurors how to give effect to mitigating
evidence that went beyond these two special issues.55 The majority in
Abdul-Kabir essentially concluded that Penry I illustrates the clearly
established law on this issue, as evidenced by the line of cases
addressing mitigating evidence in death penalty cases both before and
56
after Penry I.
In Cole’s case, the majority concluded that the trial judge’s
recommendation to the Court of Criminal Appeals that it should deny
post-conviction relief ignored Penry I, the most relevant precedent in
57
this area of jurisprudence. The trial judge had instead relied upon
three Texas state court decisions, as well as Graham v. Collins,58 to
59
deny relief. In Graham, the Supreme Court concluded that under
Texas’s special issues, the jury was able to sufficiently consider several
categories of mitigating evidence, including a troubled childhood and
abuse.60 Justice Stevens, however, concluded that the trial judge’s
reliance on Graham was misguided because the holding in Graham
was narrow and therefore not applicable to Cole’s case.61 The Court in
Graham denied collateral relief not because it held that mitigating
evidence of a troubled childhood and abuse is always sufficiently
considered under Texas’s special issues, but because granting relief
would have required announcing a new rule of constitutional law, in
contravention of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).62 According to
Justice Stevens, the narrowness of the holding in Graham is also
illustrated by Johnson v. Texas, in which the Court rejected the very
rule Graham sought—a rule that mitigating evidence of a troubled

54. Id. at 324.
55. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1670.
56. Id. at 1671–74
57. Id. at 1671–72.
58. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993).
59. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1670.
60. Graham, 506 U.S. at 474.
61. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1671.
62. Graham, 506 U.S. at 477; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (prohibiting
courts from applying a new rule of constitutional law to cases on collateral review unless the
new rule falls within one of two narrow exceptions).
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childhood and abuse is always sufficiently considered under Texas’s
special issues.63
As further evidence that the principles of Penry I are a reflection
of clearly established law, the majority also pointed to three decisions
subsequent to Penry I that explained that a jury must be able to fully
consider and give meaningful effect to all mitigating evidence before
64
65
imposing a death sentence: Penry v. Johnson, Tennard v. Dretke, and
66
Smith v. Texas.
Thus, because Penry I represented clearly established federal law,
the majority reversed the lower courts, concluding that the Texas
court’s decision to deny Cole relief was an unreasonable application
67
of Penry I. Although Cole’s evidence may not have been as
persuasive as Penry’s (it was arguably different in kind, as well as in
degree), the Court found that it “did not rebut either deliberateness
or future dangerousness but was intended to provide the jury with an
entirely different reason for not imposing a death sentence.”68 Thus,
according to the majority, the decision to deny Cole relief flatly
ignored the Court’s established principle that a juror must be able to
consider and give full effect to all mitigating evidence before
imposing the death penalty.
2. Brewer v. Quarterman
In a much shorter opinion, Justice Stevens relied upon his
exposition from Abdul-Kabir on what constitutes “clearly established
law,” to conclude that the decision denying Brewer relief should
likewise be reversed.69 The Court did not see a constitutionally
relevant distinction between Penry I and Brewer in terms of the
evidence presented concerning mental illness. Although Brewer’s
mitigating evidence was not as persuasive as Penry’s, this was not a
sufficient distinction for the Supreme Court.70 The lower courts had
denied relief because Brewer was not diagnosed with a long-term
mental illness, like Penry was, but was instead merely briefly

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 365–68 (1993).
Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (per curiam).
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1671 (2007).
Id. at 1672.
Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1709–10 (2007).
Id. at 1712.
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hospitalized during a bout with depression.71 The majority concluded
that this difference in degree did not justify the result because jurors
could reasonably find—independent of the special issues—that
72
Brewer did not deserve to be put to death.
According to the majority, Brewer’s mitigating evidence served as
a double-edged sword because although it lessened his culpability, it
73
also confirmed that he would likely pose a danger in the future. Thus,
the jury was not able to give a reasoned moral response to Brewer’s
mitigating evidence because it incriminated his conduct at the same
time as it mitigated his culpability. The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the
district court’s grant of habeas relief, failed to heed the Supreme
Court’s repeated warnings that a jury must be allowed to give full
effect to mitigating evidence in deciding whether a death sentence
applies.74
B. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Alito, Chief Justice Roberts blasted the majority by asserting that in
1999 (when the state courts denied petitioners relief) there was no
“clearly established law” on point, “but instead a dog’s breakfast of
divided, conflicting and ever-changing analyses.”75 The Chief Justice
began by stating that in the years before petitioners’ state habeas
claims were heard, the Supreme Court had considered similar
challenges to Texas’s special issue instructions at least five times.76 In
four out of five cases, the Court rejected defendants’ claims that the
special issues were insufficient vehicles by which to consider
mitigating evidence.77 The only case of the five to grant relief was
Penry I, a decision that, in Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the AbdulKabir and Brewer majority selected from the mix and anointed as the
one case representing “clearly established federal law.”78
The dissent took issue with what it deemed as essentially a re79
writing of history in the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. The
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 279–82 (5th Cir. 2006).
Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1712–13.
Id.
Id. at 1714.
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1676 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1681–84.

DO NOT DELETE

276

2/2/2009 11:18:28 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 4:267

Court’s 1993 decision in Graham, which clarified the relationship
between Jurek, Franklin and Penry I, supports Chief Justice Roberts’s
position:
It seems to us, however, that reading Penry as petitioner urges—
and thereby holding that a defendant is entitled to special
instructions whenever he can offer mitigating evidence that has
some arguable relevance beyond the special issues—would be to
require in all cases that a fourth ‘special issue’ be put to the jury:
‘Does any mitigating evidence before you, whether or not relevant
to the above [three] questions, lead you to believe that the death
penalty should not be imposed?’ The Franklin plurality rejected
precisely this contention, finding it irreconcilable with the Court’s
80
holding in Jurek, and we affirm that conclusion today.

The Chief Justice argued that the position rejected in Graham is
the very position endorsed by the majority in Abdul-Kabir.81 Chief
Justice Roberts responded to Justice Stevens’s assertion that Graham
and Johnson did not disturb the basic legal principle at issue by
questioning how this can be so when Justice Stevens himself, claiming
that the majority was no longer being faithful to Penry I, dissented in
both of these decisions.82
In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, these two post-Penry I dissenting
opinions are further evidence that the law was not “clearly
83
established” in 1999. Merely four years after Penry I, Justices Stevens
and Souter (members of the Penry I majority) dissented in Graham v.
Collins on the grounds that Penry I was the applicable controlling
precedent.84 Later that same year, in Johnson v. Texas, Justices Stevens
and Souter again dissented from the decision denying habeas relief,
and decried what they saw as the majority’s failure to follow and to
apply the precedent of Penry I.85 Chief Justice Roberts saw this as
strong evidence that Penry I was not clearly established law in 1999,
and argued that the state courts adjudicating Cole’s and Brewer’s
claims would have seen “an ongoing debate over the meaning and
significance of Penry I.”86 The dissent also took issue with, according

80. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476–77 (1993) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct.
2320, 2331 n.10 (1988)) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
81. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1680.
83. Id.
84. Graham, 506 U.S. at 506–07 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 385–86 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
86. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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to Chief Justice Roberts, the majority’s use of post-Penry I decisions
as an indicator of Penry I’s status as “clearly established law” in 1999.87
That case law is irrelevant, because under AEDPA the “clearly
established law” must be established at the time of the state court’s
decision.88 In a strong jab to the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
asserted that “AEDPA requires state courts to reasonably apply
clearly established federal law. It does not require them to have a
crystal ball.”89
According to Chief Justice Roberts, when the state courts
adjudicated Cole’s petition for post-conviction relief, no clear
precedent applied to the exact type of mitigating evidence Cole
90
presented at trial. This evidence, including a troubled childhood and
impulse control disorder, fell somewhere in between the type of
evidence presented by the defendants in Graham and Johnson (youth
and a transient upbringing) on the one hand, and the defendant in
Penry I (mental retardation and severe abuse) on the other.91 Because
there is a wide-ranging spectrum of mitigating evidence, and the effect
that the jury is able to give to such evidence is a highly fact-centered
determination, it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude
that Cole’s evidence was more like that presented in Graham and
Johnson than that in Penry I.92 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that
this type of deferential review of state court decisions is exactly what
93
AEDPA intended for habeas cases.
IV. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The substantive impact of the Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and
Brewer v. Quarterman decisions will be of limited duration, as the
Texas special issue instructions involved in these two cases have not
been used since 1991. The sharp divide between the majority and the
dissent, however, over what is “clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court” may have long-term implications
for future AEDPA cases.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1682.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1682 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1681.
Id.
Id. at 1682.
Id. at 1681 (citing Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)).
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There is a dearth of guidance from the Supreme Court as to what
is “clearly established federal law,” for purposes of AEDPA. The
Court first addressed this question in Williams v. Taylor, in which a
majority of the Court agreed that it referred to the existing Supreme
Court holdings, as opposed to dicta, as of the date of the relevant state
court decision.94 In practice, however, this general description
provides little guidance to the lower federal courts. Justice Stevens, in
a plurality opinion to Williams, went further than the majority when
he explained that clearly established law may be a standard, rather
than a bright-line rule, meaning that a general rule requiring a caseby-case application will suffice.95 This principle was illustrated in
Justice Stevens’s separate majority opinion applying AEDPA to the
state court adjudication, in which he stated that Williams’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel was “squarely governed” by
Strickland v. Washington.96 Although Strickland was a standard to be
applied on a case-by-case basis, according to Justice Stevens, that did
not make its rule any less clear or established than a more bright-line
rule from the Court.97
Since Williams, most lower federal courts cite to the majority
language from Williams that “clearly established law,” for AEDPA
purposes, refers to the Supreme Court’s holdings. There is, however,
wide divergence among the lower courts about (1) whether a
Supreme Court decision applies to the habeas petitioner’s factual
situation, and (2) the level of clarity of the existing precedent.
Lockyer v. Andrade98 provided the Court with another opportunity
to offer more guidance on what is “clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” There, the
petitioner was convicted under California’s “three strikes” recidivist
statute, and sentenced to two consecutive life terms; his third
qualifying conviction was for shoplifting $153 worth of videotapes.99
On appeal, Andrade argued that his sentence was grossly
disproportionate and violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.100 Supreme Court precedent had

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
Id. at 66–68.
Id. at 68–69.
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addressed the disproportionality issue in only three cases: Rummel v.
Estelle,101 Solem v. Helm,102 and Harmelin v. Michigan.103 The Court
acknowledged that these precedents were not “a model of clarity,” but
nonetheless found that “one governing legal principle emerge[d] as
‘clearly established’” from this “thicket of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence”: that a gross disproportionality principle applies to all
104
sentences for a term of years. Although the “precise contours” of
disproportionality in sentencing were unclear and there was confusion
about the existing trio of cases, the gross disproportionality principle
was sufficiently broad to afford the state legislature significant
discretion in determining appropriate sentences. The Court held that
the state court’s decision upholding Andrade’s sentence was not
objectively unreasonable because it was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of the gross disproportionality principle,
which was “clearly established law.”105
For purposes of what is “clearly established law,” the approach
from Justice Stevens’s Williams plurality won the day in Abdul-Kabir
and Brewer. In these consolidated cases, the Court was confronted
with a set of opinions that were not a model of clarity on the issue of
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. There is logical force
behind Justice Stevens’s argument that the principle underlying Penry
I was, and had been, clearly established, despite the lack of clarity in
its exact contours. The effect that a jury can give to mitigating
evidence appears to be based on a generalized standard, applied on a
case-by-case basis, which depends on the particular evidence
presented by any given petitioner. The approach taken by Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent holds water as well, because Cole’s and
Brewer’s state court adjudications were not objectively unreasonable;
these courts merely saw an ongoing debate within the Supreme Court
on the effect that jurors must be able to give mitigating evidence in
capital sentencing. Yet following Chief Justice Roberts’s approach,
because the AEDPA so mandates, would have required the Court to
uphold what turned out to be an unconstitutional state court
adjudication.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72.
Id. at 76–77.
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The likely future impact of the standard for “clearly established
law” emerging from these cases is that AEDPA will not constrain the
Supreme Court from making a decision that the majority views as
both correct and based in some existing precedent. AEDPA was
intended to streamline habeas review and to prevent the creation of
federal precedent upon which habeas petitioners could rely.106 The
majority in Abdul-Kabir and in Brewer, however, likely saw the
constitutional violations inherent in petitioners’ trials and used the
approach from Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Williams (as well
as that of the Andrade majority) to find clearly established law even
though the precedents had not been a model of clarity.
In future habeas cases, federal courts can take guidance from
these decisions and not be so constrained in upholding what may be
unconstitutional state-court rulings merely because AEDPA intended
to “freeze” the law and streamline habeas review. Where defense
attorneys can find and elucidate a governing legal principle that
“emerges from the thicket” in a particular area of the law, they should
be able to cite to Abdul-Kabir and Brewer and argue that their
clients’ situations present “clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.” In attempting to obtain habeas
relief, such defense attorneys will have a majority of the Court behind
them supporting their argument that the applicable law rises to the
level of clarity required by the Supreme Court. The Government will
be forced to paint the applicable legal principles as a mess, and to
attempt to distinguish Abdul-Kabir and Brewer. In circumstances in
which a governing legal principle is clear, the federal court can rely on
that principle as “clearly established law” to find that a prior
adjudication was either in accordance with or in violation of that
governing principle. As a result of the decisions in Abdul-Kabir and
Brewer, federal courts should have more discretion in conducting
habeas corpus review.

106. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3.2 (5th ed. 2005) (quoting Statement of the President of the United States upon
signing the Antiterrorism Bill, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996)); see also
Browning v. U.S., 241 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that “AEDPA was intended to
streamline the habeas application process, and our role as gatekeeper is a limited one.
Analyzing the Court's body of jurisprudence with regard to each new rule of constitutional law
would be inconsistent with this limited role and could lead to unnecessarily varied results among
the circuits.”).

